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ABSTRACT 
 
Over the last few years, a new generation of Chinese multinationals has set out to 
conquer global markets, featuring major international acquisitions that were unthinkable 
until very recently. This work seeks to analyze the nature of this emerging phenomenon, 
illustrating the reasons behind the international expansion of Chinese multinationals, the 
factors that facilitate and hinder this process, the entry modes that they use and the 
strategic implications for Western companies of their sudden arrival on the new world 
stage. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Around 200 years ago, Napoleon referred to China as a slumbering giant that was better 
to let lie because, when awakened, it would shake the world. In fact, some economic 
historians argue that we are not witnessing the birth of a new economic power but rather its 
rebirth. The Chinese call their own country Zhong Guo, which means “the central land” or 
“the middle kingdom”, and, in fact, this is not the first time that China can be found among 
the ranks of the leading world powers. Over the course of its thousands of years of history, it 
has lived through several periods of great splendor and development. Under the hegemony of 
the Western Han dynasty, between the third century BC and the first century AD, China 
opened up major trading routes—in particular, the Silk Road—which was the main 
commercial artery between Asia and Europe for hundreds of years. Later, during the Ming 
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dynasty from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, China experienced a new period of 
growth that elevated it to the status of the world’s leading seafaring power. 
Following the fall of Imperial China in 1911, there were several years of instability which 
saw a Japanese invasion and a civil war and ended with the declaration of the People’s 
Republic of China by Mao Zedong in 1949. His rule was marked by major social and political 
upheavals until Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978. That year formed a watershed—a 
before and after in the recent history of China—with the implementation of profound 
structural reforms and a process of opening up known as the “open door policy”. All of this 
translated into a period of growth and development that has continued to the present day. 
China’s cost advantages and its status as the world’s most populous country with around 
1,300 million inhabitants have caused it to be dubbed “the world’s factory” or “the biggest 
potential market in the world”. Over the last 30 years, this Asian giant has experienced one of 
the most rapid and spectacular economic transformations of modern history, with growth 
rates of over 10% a year. Everything we hear about China these days is accompanied by 
figures in the millions. It is currently the third global economy in terms of product value 
(beaten only by the US and Japan), the second largest exporter (after Germany), the third 
largest importer (after the US and Germany), the third largest recipient of foreign investment 
(and the greatest among the developing economies), the second largest consumer of energy 
(after the US), the biggest online market (with some 298 million Internet users) and the 
biggest mobile phone market (with some 500 million users). It is also the leading producer of 
cotton, steel, white goods, pork, textiles and footwear. 
Traditionally, this production has been associated with low costs, but many Chinese 
companies are now specializing in products and technologies that are increasingly 
sophisticated and innovative. Haier is the world leader in the manufacture of refrigerators, 
Huawei produces broadband Internet access equipment that is more advanced than that 
produced by some Western countries, BYD is the world’s biggest manufacturer of nickel-
cadmium batteries and holds a quarter of the global market for mobile phone batteries, 
Johnson Electric is the world’s leading producer of small electrical motors, the Pearl River 
Piano Group is the greatest global producer of pianos and China International Marine 
Containers ships 50% of international transport containers. 
These names are probably not overly familiar to Western ears, but they represent a new 
generation of Chinese multinationals that have set out to conquer global markets. It is not 
surprising that some of them have featured massive international operations that were 
unthinkable until very recently. 
The prestigious Fortune Global 500 ranking published annually by Fortune magazine, 
which lists the world’s top 500 corporations in terms of revenue, also provides data that 
enables the magnitude of this phenomenon to be calibrated. In 2009 (Fortune, 2009), 37 
Chinese companies were featured on this list (as opposed to 29 in 2008 and just 24 in 2007). 
This makes China the fifth country in the world in terms of the number of Fortune Global 500 
companies (after the US, Japan, France and Germany). China’s list is headed by two oil 
companies (Sinopec, ranked 9th, and CNPC, ranked 13th), followed by State Grid, at number 
15. 
Furthermore, Sinopec is the biggest company in Asia. On the other hand, Beijing (home 
to 26 companies) is the third city in the world with the most Fortune 500 firms, behind Tokyo 
and Paris. Also, CNPC and State Grid are the second and third companies in terms of the 
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number of employees (with over 1.6 million and 1.5 million, respectively), beaten only by the 
US firm Wal-Mart (over 2 million). 
Another example is the November 2007 floating on the stock exchange of oil and gas 
giant PetroChina, a state-owned enterprise (SOE) founded in 1999 with assets and facilities 
originating from the restructuring of CNPC. Upon its debut on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, 
it tripled its value to reach a figure of around one billion dollars, overtaking that of US oil 
company Exxon Mobil and thus becoming the biggest company in the world by market 
capitalization. 
The growing importance of China on the world stage has spawned a proliferation of 
empirical studies in prestigious international publications in recent years. However, most of 
these have focused on business and management of companies in China, in particular of Sino-
Western joint ventures (JVs) established in the country (Quer, Claver and Rienda, 2007). 
Given the emerging nature of Chinese multinationals in the international arena, much less is 
known about them to date. 
With the aim of filling this gap, the objective of our work is to analyze the phenomenon 
of the international expansion of Chinese multinationals, seeking to answer the following 
questions: In which sectors and in which geographical locations are they expanding? What 
are the underlying motives for their decisions to become international? What factors are 
driving the process and what obstacles must be faced? What entry modes are they using? Are 
the traditional approaches that have enabled an explanation of the international expansion of 
companies from other countries applicable here? And what are the strategic implications for 
Western companies? 
 
 
TARGET SECTORS AND COUNTRIES OF CHINESE MULTINATIONALS 
 
It was only a few years ago that Chinese companies first started to make foreign direct 
investments (FDIs) of any major significance. Although those with the greatest media 
coverage have been the acquisition of the PC division of IBM by Lenovo, or the European 
forays of TCL, TPV and Nanjing Automotive, the greatest FDI by a Chinese company so far 
has been the 7.5 billion dollars paid by Sinopec for the acquisition of Geneva-based Addax 
Petroleum Corp. Table 1 below summarizes the principal investments made by Chinese 
multinationals to date. 
According to official figures published by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), 
China´s outward FDI net flows in 2008 reached 55.91 billion dollars, of which 41.86 billion 
corresponded to non-financial FDIs and 14.05 billion to financial FDIs, essentially within the 
banking and insurance sectors (MOFCOM, 2009). By the end of 2008, China’s accumulated 
outward FDI stock had risen to 183.97 billion dollars. Up until the end of 2008, it is estimated 
that nearly 8,500 Chinese companies had carried out around 12,000 FDI operations in 174 
countries around the globe. Table 2 gives an overview of the evolution of China´s outward 
FDI since 1982. 
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Table 1. Main FDIs of Chinese multinationals 
 
Chinese company Target company Type of investment Year 
TCL Schneider Electronics (Germany), TV 
manufacturer 
Acquisition 2002 
TCL Mobile division of Alcatel (France) Joint venture  
(majority control) 
2004 
TCL TV and DVD subsidiary of Thomson 
(France) 
Joint venture  
(majority control) 
2004 
Lenovo PC division of IBM (USA) Acquisition 2004 
TPV PC monitor and TV flat screen division 
of Philips (Holland) 
Acquisition 2004 
Shanghai Automotive 
Industry Corporation 
(SAIC) 
Ssangyong Motor (South Korea), 
automobile manufacturer 
Partial acquisition 
(majority control, 
51%) 
2004 
Nanjing Automotive MG Rover (UK), automobile 
manufacturer 
Acquisition 2005 
China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) 
PetroKazakhstan (Canada), oil Acquisition 2005 
China National Offshore 
Oil Corporation (CNOOC) 
Oil facilities of South Atlantic Petroleum 
(Nigeria) 
Partial acquisition 
(45%) 
2006 
Sinopec Udmurtneft (Russia), oil Acquisition 2006 
CITIC Group Kazakhstan oil assets of Nations Energy 
(Canada) 
Acquisition 2006 
China Minsheng Banking 
Corporation 
UCBH (EE.UU.), banking Partial acquisition 
(9.9%) 
2007 
China Development Bank Barclays (UK), banking Partial acquisition 
(3.1%) 
2007 
Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China (ICBC) 
Standard Bank (South Africa), banking Partial acquisition 
(20%) 
2007 
Bank of China La Compagnie Financiere Edmond de 
Rothschild (Francia), banking 
Partial acquisition 
(20%) 
2008 
China Oilfield Services Awilco Offshore (Norway), oil Acquisition 2008 
Petrochina Singapore Petroleum (Singapore), oil Partial acquisition 
(45%) 
2009 
Sinopec Addax Petroleum Corp. (Switzerland), oil Acquisition 2009 
Source: Various reports and publications 
 
As shown in Table 3, the sectors in which FDI flows have increased the most over the 
last three years have been leasing and business services, finance, and wholesale and retailing 
(MOFCOM, 2009). Up until the end of 2008, four sectors had accumulated around 78% of 
the Chinese outward FDI stock: leasing and business services (29.7%), finance (19.9%), 
wholesale and retail trade (16.2%), and mining (12.4%). 
In terms of the geographical distribution of Chinese FDI, Table 4 shows the FDI flows 
and the accumulated stock by regions over the 2006–2008 period, while Table 5 gives the 
ranking of the top 10 host countries in order of accumulated stock up to the end of 2008 
(MOFCOM, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
International Expansion of Chinese Multinationals 5 
Table 2. China’s outward FDI 1982–2008 (millions of US $) 
 
 FDI flow FDI stock 
1982–1990     495 (annual average)   4455 (by the end of 1990) 
1991–2000   2331 (annual average) 27768 (by the end of 2000) 
2001   6885 34654 
2002   2700 22900 
2003   2854.65 33222.22 
2004   5497.99 44777.26 
2005 12261.17 57205.62 
2006 21163.96 90630.91 
2007 26506.09 117910.50 
2008 55907.17 183970.71 
Source: UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment Database, http://stats.unctad.org/fdi/ [1982-2001]; MOFCOM, Statistical 
Bulletins of China´s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/ [2002-2008]. 
 
 
Table 3. China’s outward FDI by industry 2006–2008 (millions of US $) 
 
FDI flow FDI stock 
Industry 
2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 
Leasing & 
business 
service 
4521.66 5607.34 21717.23 19463.60 30515.03 54583.03 
Finance 3529.99 1667.80 14048 15605.37 16719.91 36693.88 
Wholesale and 
retailing 
1113.91 6604.18 6514.13 12955.20 20232.88 29858.66 
Mining 8539.51 4062.77 5823.51 17901.62 15013.81 22868.40 
Transport, 
warehousing & 
postal service 
1376.39 4065.48 2655.74 7568.19 12059.04 14520.02 
Manufacturing 906.61 2126.50 1766.03 7529.62 9544.25 9661.88 
Other 
industries 
1175.89 2372.02 3382.53 9607.31 13825.58 15784.84 
Total 21163.96 26506.09 55907.17 90630.91 117910.50 183970.71 
Source: MOFCOM (2009) 
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Table 4. China’s outward FDI by region 2006–2008 (millions of US $) 
 
FDI flow FDI stock 
Region 
2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 
Asia 7663.25 16593.15 43547.50 47978.05 79217.93 131316.99 
Latin 
America 
8468.74 4902.41 3677.25 19694.37 24700.91 32240.15 
Africa 519.86 1574.31 5490.55 2556.82 4461.83 7803.83 
Europe 597.71 1540.43 875.79 2269.82 4458.54 5133.96 
Oceania 126.36 770.08 1951.87 939.48 1830.40 3816 
North 
America 
258.05 1125.71 364.21 1587.02 3240.89 3659.78 
Total 17633.97 26506.09 55907.17 75025.55 117910.50 183970.71 
Source: MOFCOM (2009); 2006 data only include non-finance outward FDI  
 
Table 5. China’s outward FDI stock by countries up to 2008 (millions of US $) 
 
Country FDI stock up to 2008 Percentage over total FDI 
stock 
  1. Hong Kong 115845.28 63% 
  2. Cayman Islands 20327.45 11% 
  3. British Virgin Islands 10477.33 5.7% 
  4. Australia 3355.29 1.8% 
  5. Singapore 3334.77 1.8% 
  6. South Africa 3048.62 1.7% 
  7. US 2389.9 1.3% 
  8. Russia 1838.28 1% 
  9. Macau 1560.78 0.8% 
10. Pakistan 1327.99 0.7% 
Total top 10 163505.69 88.9% 
Total 183970.71 100% 
Source: MOFCOM (2009) 
 
 
By regions, Asia accounts for both the greatest FDI flow and the greatest 
accumulated stock over the three years in question. Ten countries account for around 
90% of the FDI stock accumulated until 2008. Hong Kong is a clear leader at the top of 
the ranking, with over 60% of the accumulated FDI, followed by two Latin American 
tax havens: the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands. Investment in this kind 
of tax haven habitually results in reinvestments in other economies, including China 
itself. Following at a considerable distance are Australia, Singapore and South Africa. 
In short, given that 79.7% of the accumulated Chinese FDI stock is concentrated in 
three tax havens (Hong Kong can also be considered as such), it becomes difficult to 
know for certain the true geographical distribution of Chinese FDI. 
In any case, it is logical that there is a greater presence of Chinese companies on 
the Asian markets, due to geographical proximity, closer cultural similarity and low 
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relative operational costs (Yin and Choi, 2005). Therefore, as Chinese multinationals 
develop overseas, it is to be expected that their main focus of attention will be the 
Asian Pacific region, thus demonstrating a geographical pattern similar to that of other 
multinationals around the world, whose expansion is more regional than global 
(Rugman and Li, 2007). 
 
 
REASONS BEHIND THE FDI OF CHINESE MULTINATIONALS 
 
Inevitably, reflecting on this emerging phenomenon leads us to recall the experience of 
companies from Japan and South Korea, who expanded during the second half of the 
twentieth century. While the timescale of the Chinese FDI has had to necessarily differ from 
that of its regional counterparts, it has likewise been motivated by factors such as saturated 
home markets, the search for natural resources overseas and the need to withstand 
protectionist trade barriers (Taylor, 2002). These parallels, alongside the socio-cultural 
differences with regard to Western countries and the concerns that fear of the “yellow peril” 
awakes in these, mean that to a certain degree it could appear to be déjà vu (Tung, 2005). 
However, the motivating factors of Chinese FDI show a series of differentiating traits 
(Deng, 2004). The FDI made by Chinese companies has not been motivated by the quest for 
efficiency through cost reduction (they have their cost advantages in China, and even relocate 
to the interior of the country should costs increase in the coastal areas). Furthermore, the FDIs 
used as export platforms, which have been the incentive for some companies in the newly 
industrialized countries of Southeast Asia, have not been a motivational factor for Chinese 
multinationals. 
At first, Chinese FDI mainly sought to access natural resources. However, over recent 
years the motivations have broadened to embrace other objectives, some of which are 
common to multinationals the world over. Below, we shall examine the reasons behind these 
FDIs, grouping them into three blocks (Deng, 2004; Hong and Sun, 2006; Wong and Chan, 
2003; Wu and Sia, 2002). 
 
 
Resource Seeking 
  
The search for resources, particularly natural resources, has been one of the traditional 
objectives of Chinese FDI. Until 1991, it was concentrated on Canada and Australia, 
extending to other countries during the 1990s with an increasing emphasis on fuel and 
industrial raw materials. One of the most significant examples of this strategy can be found in 
the purchase of Canadian oil company PetroKazakhstan by CNPC in 2005. 
 
 
Market Seeking and Diversification 
 
At first, Chinese FDI also often arose from the need to diversify markets and obtain 
foreign exchange. The establishment of trading subsidiaries promoted Chinese exports, since 
these subsidiaries were founded upon distribution channels and provided knowledge of the 
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market. Recently, the Chinese market has reached its limit in certain areas, causing an excess 
of production capacity in sectors such as textiles, bicycles, footwear and domestic appliances. 
Also, Chinese companies face quantitative restrictions on exports to other countries (which 
are even more severe than for non-Chinese companies), so productive FDI has been in many 
cases the solution to continue accessing those markets. 
Some major SOEs have made FDIs seeking to diversify risks. This strategy has been 
reinforced by the trade reforms started in the 1980s, which meant that some companies lost 
their monopoly in China. One such example is Sinochem, a foreign-trading SOE that held a 
monopoly over the import and export of oil and chemical fertilizers. As a result of the 
reforms, Sinochem had to find new lines of business, which have transformed it into a 
company that is present in sectors as diverse as oil, chemicals, tourism and real estate. 
Many Chinese SMEs have also sought to cultivate their comparative advantage in 
developing areas of Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America. Essentially, these are small-
scale, work-intensive projects of little added value, in which Chinese firms provide 
equipment, machinery and raw materials, through which they also contribute to increasing 
exports from China. 
 
 
Strategic Asset Seeking 
 
Over the past few years, some Chinese companies, rather than exploit an existing 
competitive advantage, have sought to gain a greater edge through the acquisition of strategic 
assets. On the one hand, they are looking to access advanced technology and managerial and 
productive know-how in developed countries, as is the case of Haier, which was one of the 
first Chinese companies to establish a production plant in the US. They also invest in 
developed markets seeking internationally recognized trademarks. Examples of this include 
the international operations of Lenovo (with its purchase of the PCs division of IBM) and 
TCL (with its acquisition of Schneider Electronics or the JVs that have enabled it to control 
the mobile phone business of Alcatel and the television and DVD business of Thomson). 
 
 
OVERSEAS EXPANSION OF CHINESE FIRMS: 
DRIVING FORCES AND OBSTACLES  
 
Facilitators of Chinese FDI: The Role of the Government 
 
The internationalization of Chinese companies has been favored by factors such as strong 
governmental support, the ability to combine this support with entrepreneurial action and the 
obtaining of foreign capital, and the willingness of foreign companies to sell or share 
technology, know-how and branding (Child and Rodrigues, 2005). With regard to this last 
point, Chinese multinationals practice what is known as coopetition (competition and 
cooperation at the same time) with global players both at home and in the host country. These 
ties with rivals sit well with the yin-yang philosophy that is so deeply rooted in Chinese 
culture: the yin (cooperation) and the yang (competition) can been seen as two mutually 
complementary sides of the same coin (Luo and Tung, 2007). 
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Another outstanding factor is the personal traits of Chinese managers (Zhang and Van 
den Bulcke, 1996), as is the case at Haier. Its chairman Zhang Ruimin took over the 
management in 1984 of what was to be the seed of Haier: a refrigerator factory in Qingdao 
with enormous losses. Since then, his strong leadership has accelerated decision-making and 
has enabled Haier to expand into a large number of countries in a short space of time (Liu and 
Li, 2002). Entrepreneurial and managerial skills in Chinese companies have improved over 
recent years thanks not only to the learning derived from foreign companies set up in China 
but also to the development of private property, the transformation of SOEs and the 
encouragement of hi-tech firms (Rui and Yip, 2008). 
In any case, the real driving force behind the process has been the Chinese government. 
FDI was first permitted in 1979, but it remained prohibited for private companies until 2003. 
During that initial period, the internationalization of Chinese companies was tightly 
controlled by the government (Buckley et al., 2007). The setting up of overseas operations by 
Chinese firms then became one of the official policies for opening up the economy (Hong and 
Sun, 2006), with the leading role being played by SOEs, which were seen as instruments 
through which to achieve national objectives (Zhang and Van den Bulcke, 1996). 
The year 2001 brought a major boost with China’s entry into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and, in particular, with the announcement by the then president Jiang 
Zemin of the “go out” policy. This initiative sought to promote the international 
competitiveness of Chinese companies by reducing obstacles to FDI. In the years to come, it 
is expected that the government will continue to provide incentives for the process. In fact, 
both the current president, Hu Jintao, and the prime minister, Wen Jiabao, believe that the 
formation of major multinationals will help China to become an economic superpower. 
 
 
Restrictions and Obstacles for Chinese Multinationals 
 
Obviously, the emerging rise of Chinese multinationals is not without problems. As late 
entrants to international trade with less experience in globalization, they are likely to be at a 
disadvantage compared to their Asian and Western counterparts. In particular, the main 
problems and challenges they must face are the following (Luo and Tung, 2007; Wu, 2007): 
 
• Due to their limited experience in mergers and acquisitions, they have yet to 
demonstrate whether they have the skills required to face post-acquisition difficulties 
(for example, reconciling cultural differences). 
• They lack international experience (in particular, specific market knowledge, which 
is tacit in nature and is only acquired through learning by doing). 
• They need to improve their product and process innovation (since it is difficult to 
survive long term trusting only to acquisitions for knowledge development). 
• The state ownership of many of them makes them vulnerable to political risk in 
countries where the assets they seek are considered strategic. 
• The less developed status of the home stock markets and the lack of transparency 
derived from their state ties mean their corporate governance is generally weaker. 
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Some Chinese multinationals are trying to overcome these obstacles in various ways. 
Haier attempts to overcome its technological disadvantages by establishing R&D centers in 
developed countries and alliances with Western multinationals (Liu and Li, 2002). Lenovo, 
with its integration with IBM, appeals to the principles of candor, respect and compromise to 
join employees from two different cultural backgrounds (Liu, 2007). 
Likewise, Chinese companies like Huawei or Haier who are facing strong domestic 
competition, have less governmental protection and place emphasis on R&D, managerial 
skills and brand image are better candidates for international success than SOEs that operate 
in protected industries and have been slower when it comes to accepting the realities of a 
market driven by efficiency (Rugman and Li, 2007). 
 
 
FOREIGN MARKET ENTRY STRATEGIES OF CHINESE COMPANIES 
 
Relying on their advantages and seeking to overcome obstacles, Chinese companies have 
mainly employed three entry strategies in their internationalization process (Child and 
Rodrigues, 2005). 
The first of these is the original equipment manufacture through JVs or licenses. It is 
an inward method of internationalization: in other words it happens within China itself. It 
consists of associating with a foreign multinational to obtain modern practices that help 
to strengthen international competitiveness with a view to eventual outward 
internationalization. Examples of this strategy can be found at Chinese companies such as 
Galanz (currently the world’s leading microwave producer), which was originally 
producing microwaves for many different international brands, or Huawei (one of the 
world’s leading suppliers of broadband Internet access equipment), which initially 
established several JVs with foreign companies. This also reflects a characteristic trait of 
some mature industries, in which the centre of competition leans towards production 
costs and quality control, meaning that the assembling company can end up becoming the 
“boss”, which happened for example with the entry of TCL in Thomson (Morck, Yeung 
and Zhao, 2008). 
The second entry mode is acquisition. This has been chosen by large state-owned 
materials processing companies, which have made major acquisitions to ensure the 
supply of raw materials. This mode has also been selected by Chinese companies outside 
of the primary sector, with the aim of accumulating market strength (accessing 
technology, ensuring R&D skills or acquiring international branding). Acquisition 
provides a quick route to these benefits. Some of the abovementioned acquisitions, such 
as Lenovo’s acquisition of the PCs division of IBM, are illustrative of this strategy. 
From a strategic intent perspective, international acquisitions are used by Chinese 
multinationals for various reasons (Rui and Yip, 2008): 
 
• To acquire strategic assets and thus compensate for their competitive 
disadvantages. 
• To leverage their competitive advantages, such as low labor costs (initially in 
production and subsequently in engineering and other support activities) or low 
financing costs (deriving from state ownership or government support). 
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• As a strategic choice over other entry modes (by being an easier and quicker way 
of obtaining a complete set of new capabilities). 
• To overcome institutional constraints (such as the lack of development in 
intellectual property rights, which discourages local R&D) or to exploit 
institutional advantages (such as the strong government support for FDI or the 
nation´s huge foreign exchange reserves and domestic savings). 
 
The third route is the organic international expansion, which involves the greenfield 
establishment of subsidiaries in other countries. The aim in this case tends to be to obtain 
advantages of differentiation in terms of, for example, adaptation to local tastes and 
needs, although it also facilitates managerial control and the possibilities for global 
integration. Domestic appliances manufacturer Haier may be deemed one of the best 
examples of a Chinese company that has gone international mainly along this route. 
 
 
CHINESE MULTINATIONALS AND THE EXISTING 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Traditionally, different conceptual frameworks have been used to explain the 
internationalization of companies and the behavior of multinationals. Focusing on the most 
influential, we shall reflect on the degree to which they are applicable in the case of Chinese 
companies. 
 
 
The Internationalization Process Model 
 
This approach holds that many companies follow a gradual process of 
internationalization, the onset of which is determined by two elements (Johanson and 
Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 1990): the psychic distance, which 
causes the company to begin its international expansion in countries it is more familiar with; 
and the size of the potential market, which can lead it to enter smaller markets first, which 
require a smaller initial commitment of resources or where there is less competition. On the 
basis of all this, the internationalization process can occur over a series of stages that involve 
successively greater commitment as experience and knowledge is gained. 
In relation to this model, it has been observed that Chinese multinationals that had 
established JVs with Western companies within China managed to acquire not only 
technology but also management skills and experience that have enabled them to skip stages 
in their internationalization process (Warner, Hong and Xiaojun, 2004; Young, Huang and 
McDermott, 1996; Zhang and Van den Bulcke, 1996). This route in which stages are skipped 
has been taken by many multinationals from emerging markets, which tend to become 
international very quickly and not incrementally; as latecomers on the global scene, they need 
to accelerate their rate of internationalization to catch up with other companies (Luo and 
Tung, 2007). This is another of the reasons behind the increase in international acquisitions 
by Chinese companies over recent years. 
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Nevertheless, some indications show that a series of stages have been followed (Young et 
al., 1996). At times, the exporting stage (outward internationalization) tends to precede the 
establishment of JVs with foreign companies within China (inward internationalization), 
since the former provides the foreign exchange necessary to import technology. Once they 
have been assimilated, modified and improved, these received technological capabilities in 
turn stimulate more advanced methods of outward internationalization. 
With regard to the psychic distance, its influence can depend on the objectives of the 
Chinese company: while investments that sought markets might well have been initially 
aimed at countries in which this distance was smaller, investments that seek know-how have 
been mainly aimed at developed countries in North America and Europe, which are culturally 
more distant (Young et al., 1996). Also, many Chinese companies do not seem to shy away 
from psychic distance, perhaps aided by the alliances they have made in China with 
multinationals from developed countries (Luo and Tung, 2007). 
 
 
The Eclectic Paradigm 
 
Another of the most widely known approaches is Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm (1981b, 
1988) which focuses on FDI decisions. Its main hypothesis is that the company will commit 
to FDI if three conditions are simultaneously satisfied: (1) the company has a competitive 
advantage over companies of other nationalities (ownership advantage); (2) it is more 
profitable for the company to internalize this advantage through an extension of its own 
activities rather than externalizing it via licenses or contracts with other companies 
(internalization advantage); and (3) it is more profitable to exploit this advantage together 
with some factor linked to the host country (location advantage).  
The Eclectic Paradigm is applicable to the expansion of multinationals from emerging 
markets towards other developing countries in search of location advantages to benefit from 
their unique capabilities—for example, those based on low costs (Luo and Tung, 2007). 
However, when applying the Eclectic Paradigm to the case of Chinese multinationals it is 
necessary to take into account a series of peculiarities. As stated by Mathews (2006), 
multinationals from the Asian Pacific—including Chinese multinationals—are newcomers on 
the global scene and therefore do not depend for their international expansion upon the prior 
possession of resources, as has been the case for many multinationals from countries from the 
Triad (US, Europe and Japan). Instead, these new companies use international expansion to 
benefit from resources that would otherwise be unavailable. This internationalization is rather 
different from that seeking to exploit existing resources. This poses a challenge for the 
Eclectic Paradigm, which is why Mathews (2006) proposes the LLL framework as a 
complementary alternative: 
 
• Linkage. The critical starting point for these companies is that they are not focusing 
on their own advantages but on the resources that they will be able to access from 
outside of the company. 
• Leverage. This focuses on the ways that links can be established with other 
companies so that the resources may be used or exploited; it is related to the degree 
to which the resources are accessible. 
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• Learning. The repeated application of the two previous processes can result in the 
company learning to perform these operations more efficiently. 
Dunning himself (2006) has responded to this proposal to reconsider the Eclectic 
Paradigm, offering the following reflections: 
• The determining factors for Chinese FDI that seeks to exploit assets are reasonably 
explained by the Eclectic Paradigm, while the determining factors for FDI that seeks 
to augment assets fit better with the idea that, at least, some of the competitive 
advantages of companies “follow” rather than “lead” their internationalization. 
• However, to engage in the latter kind of FDI the company must have certain unique 
advantages; in the case of China, these could include the ability to generate funds to 
acquire a foreign company and favorable access to large markets through the Chinese 
economic area. 
 
In any case, each of the models presents its own respective slant: while the Eclectic 
Paradigm is more internal-focused, the LLL model is more external-focusing in its 
contrasting explanation. For this reason, and with the purpose of obtaining a more balanced 
view, Li (2007) proposes an integration of both. 
 
 
The Investment Development Path  
 
The Investment Development Path is a theoretical approach that proposes the existence of 
a systematic relationship between the level of an economy’s development and its inward and 
outward FDI (Dunning, 1981a, 1986; Dunning and Narula, 1996). According to this focus, 
the economic development of a country has a positive influence both on the capacity for 
internationalization of domestic companies and on the location advantages it offers foreign 
companies. The model establishes several development phases, grouping together the less 
developed countries in the early stages and the more advanced or industrialized countries in 
the latter stages. 
Two studies have tackled this model in the case of China. On the one hand, Cai (1999), 
analyzing the 1979–1996 period, concludes that China’s position at the end of this period was 
in the second stage of the Investment Development Path: the inward FDI was growing due to 
improved location advantages and the outward FDI was emerging thanks to the improved 
ownership advantages of Chinese firms. 
On the other hand, Liu, Buck and Shu (2005), based on figures from the 1979–2002 
period, maintain that Chinese outward FDI appears to be consistent with the hypothesis of the 
Investment Development Path with regards to its relationship to the country’s level of 
economic development. The increase in GDP per capita in China and the rise in the value of 
the investments in human capital were the two factors that most affected the growth in 
Chinese outward FDI. 
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Other Theoretical Frameworks 
 
Beyond the abovementioned theoretical frameworks, other studies have attempted to 
apply some traditional concepts of internationalization to the case of Chinese firms. Thus Yiu, 
Lau and Bruton (2007) examine the influence on Chinese FDI of home country networks, 
technological capabilities and corporate entrepreneurship. Firstly, they observe that network 
ties in China—especially institutional network—facilitate the FDI of Chinese companies. 
Secondly, they found that the effects of firm technological capabilities depend on the intensity 
of competition within the Chinese industry; Chinese companies, particularly those heavily 
involved in R&D, show a greater level of internationalization when they attempt to overcome 
competitive disadvantages at home. Finally, corporate entrepreneurship mediates the effects 
of technological capabilities and home country network ties on FDI. 
Meanwhile, Buckley et al. (2007) find that Chinese FDI has both a conventional and an 
idiosyncratic dimension. From the conventional viewpoint, Chinese FDI is positively linked 
to the proportion of ethnic Chinese in the host population (cultural proximity), to the size of 
the host market and to the liberalizing policy of the Chinese government. From an 
idiosyncratic viewpoint they find that, contrary to expectation, Chinese FDI is attracted rather 
than deterred by political risk in the host country. This can be attributed to the low cost of 
capital enjoyed by Chinese companies (most of which are SOEs) as a consequence of home 
country capital market imperfections. Also, their experience of operating in a highly regulated 
and controlled domestic environment may have endowed them with advantages necessary for 
being competitive in other emerging economies.  
Therefore, while in many cases Chinese companies do not have asset advantages like 
technology and branding, they do have a transaction advantage: the ability to manage 
relationships within a complex environment like China. This gives them an edge over 
multinationals from developed countries when it comes to investing in markets with these 
institutional characteristics (Morck, Yeung and Zhao, 2008). One example of this can be 
found in CNPC’s entry in PetroKazakhstan, which had previously been controlled in that 
country by a Canadian firm. 
Finally, questions concerning the organization, control structure and operating policies of 
Chinese multinationals have also been tackled. In general, the pattern of managerial behavior 
shows two characteristics (Warner et al., 2004): control by the parent company at 
headquarters, which is stronger when the Chinese multinational is a SOE; and the legacy and 
philosophy of socialist China, which can lead to the formation of cultures that place emphasis 
on both discipline and paternalist leadership. This has been reflected in the mentality of many 
Chinese directors who, influenced by the tradition of the Chinese economic system in which 
direct control is the main means for coordinating economic activity, overvalue entry modes 
that involve tight control, as opposed to other alternatives such as long-term contracts. This 
enables them to obtain a series of private benefits such as economic gain, status, power or 
respect, and to strengthen Chinese national pride overseas (Morck, Yeung and Zhao, 2008). 
However, an organization characterized by tight central control over decision-making is 
hampered by the lack of information on foreign markets and by the need to depend on outside 
suppliers on the international markets, which constrain the ethnocentric orientation of 
international marketing (Walters and Zhu, 1995). 
With regards to human resources policies, moving away from the conventional idea that 
managerial control by expatriates tends to increase with resource commitment and with more 
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risky entry modes, many Chinese multinationals tends to use local senior management teams 
in advanced countries, for example Lenovo and Haier, whose US offices are run by natives 
(Luo and Tung, 2007). In any case, they usually adopt an ethnocentric approach to 
international training and management development for both natives and expatriates (Shen 
and Darby, 2006). 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It is appropriate to wonder at this point whether the whole of this emerging process of 
international expansion by Chinese multinationals is a relatively circumstantial phenomenon 
or whether it is something that could continue and even become more pronounced in the 
future. Factors that could lead us to think that over the next few years the latter will be closer 
to the truth (Hong and Sun, 2006; Taylor, 2002; Wu, 2007) include the following: 
 
• The capital flows received from overseas, the huge current account surplus, the 
enormous foreign currency reserves and the high domestic savings rate could favor 
the expansion of Chinese FDI. This would also be aided by a potential revaluation of 
the renminbi or yuan (China’s currency), which would mean greater liquidity and 
would make acquisitions more feasible. 
• The consequences of China’s entry into the WTO, the liberalization of FDI regimes 
worldwide and the attempt to avoid trade conflicts with the US and the EU will 
encourage Chinese FDI in order to maintain existing markets and to find new ones. 
• Competitive pressure from foreign multinationals in China and the liberalization of 
the country’s service sector could encourage opportunities to be sought overseas. 
• Acquisitions in developed countries (with the idea of re-launching troubled firms) 
could help avoid job losses, which is something that could be welcomed by host 
governments. 
• Chinese investment in countries rich in raw materials could help to revitalize sectors 
in decline and even increase exports from those countries. 
• The Chinese government’s deepening of facilitative policies would also help to boost 
the process. 
 
In short, if a large number of these factors converge, the recent international acquisitions 
by Chinese multinationals could be merely the tip of the iceberg (Wu, 2007). Over the 
coming years it is likely that Chinese multinationals will continue to develop overseas, 
exploiting specific advantages of their home country (cheap qualified and unqualified labor). 
However, for their long-term success they must develop firm-specific advantages in 
knowledge and technology (Rugman and Li, 2007). 
Among some Western managers there is the belief that high-tech businesses are immune 
to Chinese competition. This could be a mistaken and dangerous idea, especially when taking 
into account that gunpowder, paper and the compass, for example, were all invented in China. 
These Chinese multinationals could be “hidden dragons” that over the coming years will 
become the main rivals of many Western companies (Zeng and Williamson, 2003).  
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Western companies must be conscious of the strategic implications of this whole process 
(Hong and Sun, 2006). On one hand, the success of Chinese companies in industries such as 
electronics and domestic appliances is based on classic competitive advantages (flexibility, 
fast response, customer orientation and sensitivity to niche markets). Some of these 
advantages have already been enjoyed by Korean and Japanese firms for decades, which is 
why, while mindful of the differences, the history of competition with them could be useful to 
the West. 
On the other hand, the experience of Chinese multinationals shows that the combination 
of R&D acquired overseas and low home costs can bring major competitive advantages. The 
best strategy for Western companies to maintain their lead would be to intensify their R&D 
instead of simply defending their technologies. It is also worth considering the trade-off of 
advance and retreat—in other words, focusing on those businesses in which the main 
competitive advantage lies and retreating from those in which this advantage is in decline. 
This was what Alcatel did in its alliance with TCL when it sacrificed its mobile phone 
business in its quest to boost its telecommunications infrastructure. 
In any case, to face up to this emerging competition it is necessary to deepen our 
knowledge of Chinese multinationals. Several areas deserve special attention (Tung, 2005; 
Morck, Yeung and Zhao, 2008): the challenges faced by China when it comes to managing 
companies overseas (for example, the attitude of host country nationals who work for Chinese 
bosses, the squaring of Chinese employment policies in other places, the development of a 
global identity or the design of flexible operations between countries); the partner selection 
processes (in particular, the role of culture and the countries preferred by China in the search 
for partners); and how to improve their corporate governance. 
All of this would help Western firms to familiarize themselves with companies that are 
still perceived as distant and unknown but that, if this trend continues, are destined to become 
leading actors on the global stage. In the same way that today when, in hindsight, we think of 
the leading multinationals involved in what we now know as globalization our minds turn to 
European multinationals (in the first half of the twentieth century), North American 
multinationals (after World War II) and Japanese and Korean multinationals (in the final 
decades of the twentieth century), perhaps within a few years this chronology will continue 
with the Chinese multinationals of the early twenty-first century. 
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